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Abstract:
In View Of The Fact That Log Files Hold Record
Of Most System Events Including User Activities
They Turn Out To Be An Important Target For
Malicious Attackers. An Attacker Breaking Into A
System Normally Would Try Not To Leave Traces
Of His Or Her Activities Behind. As A Result The
First Thing An Attacker Often Does Is To Harm
Log Files Or Break Off The Logging Services. In
Addition The Sensitive Information Contained In
Log Files Often Directly Contributes To
Confidentiality Breaches. An Illustration Of This Is
When Logs Contain Database Transaction Data.
Regularly Log Information Can Be Cooperative To
An Attacker In Attainment Unauthorized Access
To System. One Example Of This Is The Case
When A User Incorrectly Enters Her Password In
The Username Field While Logging Into A System.
Logging Programs Will Store Up The Password As
The User-Id To Evidence The Information That A
User Has Failed To Log In. Last But Not Least
Information In Log File Can Also Be Used To
Cause Privacy Breaches For Users In The System
Since The Log File Contains Record Of All Events
In The System. It Is Extremely Significant That
Logging Be Provided In A Protected Manner And
That The Log Records Are Effectively Protected
For A Predetermined Amount Of Time Maybe
Even Indefinitely. Traditional Logging Protocols
That Are Based On Syslog Have Not Been
Designed With Such Security Features In Mind.
Keywords: Cloud Computing, Logging, Privacy,
Security.
Introduction:
The Up-And-Coming Concept Of Cloud
Computing Promises A Low Cost Chance For
Organizations To Store And Manage Log Records
In A Proper Manner. Organizations Can
Subcontract The Long-Term Storage Requirements
Of Log Files To The Cloud. The Challenges Of
Storing And Maintaining The Log Records Become
A Concern Of The Cloud Provider. Since The
Cloud Provider Is Providing A Single Service To
Many Organizations That It Will Advantage From
Economics Of Scale. Approaching Log Records To
The Cloud Though Introduces A New Challenge In
Storing And Maintaining Log Records. The Cloud
Provider Can Be Honest But Curious. This Means
That It Can Try Not Only To Get Private
Information Directly From Log Records But Also
Link Log Record Related Activities To Their
Sources. No Existing Protocol Addresses All The
Challenges That Happen When Log Storage And
Maintenance Is Pushed To The Cloud. Securely
Maintaining Log Records Over Extended Periods
Of Time Is Very Significant To The Proper
Functioning Of Any Organization. Integrity Of The
Log Files And That Of The Logging Process Need
To Be Ensured At All Times. In Addition As Log
Files Often Contain Sensitive Information
Confidentiality And Privacy Of Log Records Are
Evenly Important. However Deploying A Secure
Logging Infrastructure Involves Considerable
Capital Expenses That Many Organizations May
Find Irresistible. Delegating Log Management To
The Cloud Appears To Be A Feasible Cost Saving
Measure. In This Paper We Identify The
Challenges For A Secure Cloud-Based Log
Management Service And Propose A Framework
For Doing The Same.
Related Work:
Most Of The Approaches Are Based On Syslog
Which Is The De Facto Standard For Network
Wide Logging Protocol. The Syslog Protocol Uses
UDP To Move Log Information To The Log
Server. Thus There Is No Dependable Delivery Of
Log Messages. Moreover Syslog Does Not Defend
Log Records During Transit Or At The End-Points.
Syslog-Ng Is A Substitute That Is Backward
Compatible With Syslog. Some Of Its Features
Include Support For Ipv6 Ability To Transfer Log
Messages Reliably Using TCP And Sieve The
Content Of Logs Using Regular Expressions.
Syslog-Ng Recommend Log Record Encryption
Using SSL During Transmission So As To Protect
The Data From Confidentiality And Integrity
Violate While In Transit. Though Syslog-Ng Does
Not Guard Against Log Data Modifications When
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It Resides At An End-Point. Syslog-Sign Is An
Another Augmentation To Syslog That Adds
Origin Authentication, Message Integrity, Replay
Resistance, Message Sequencing And Detection Of
Missing Messages By Using Two Additional
Messages Signature Blocks And Certificate Blocks.
Regrettably If Signature Blocks Connected With
Log Records Get Deleted After Authentication
Tamper Proof And Forward Integrity Is Only
Partially Fulfilled. Syslog-Sign Also Does Not
Supply Confidentiality Or Privacy During The
Transmission Of Data Or At The End Points.
Existing System:
The Cloud Provider Can Be Honest But Curious.
This Means That It Can Attempt Not Only To Get
Confidential Information Directly From Log
Records But Also Link Log Record Related
Activities To Their Sources. No Existing Protocol
Addresses All The Challenges That Happen When
Log Storage And Maintenance Is Pushed To The
Cloud. We Also Develop Protocols So That Log
Records Can Be Transmitted And Retrieved In An
Unspecified Manner Over An Existing
Anonymizing Infrastructure Such As Tor. This
Successfully Prevents The Cloud Provider Or Any
Other Observer From Correlating Requests For Log
Data With The Requester Or Generator. At Last
We Develop A Proof-Of-Concept Prototype To
Exhibit The Viability Of Our Approach And
Discuss Some Early Experiences With It.
Proposed System:
The Chief Thought Is That Log Records Are First
Processed By A Pseudonymizer Before Being
Archived. The Pseudonymizer Filters Out
Identifying Features From Definite Fields In The
Log Record And Substitutes Them With Carefully
Crafted Pseudonyms. Thus This Protocol Does Not
Guarantee Correctness Of Logs. To Protect Prêt
Compromise Log Data From Post Compromise
Insertion, Deletion, Modification, And Reordering.
Forward Integrity Is Established By A Secret Key
That Becomes The Starting Point Of A Hash-
Chain. The Hash-Chain Is Produced By A
Cryptographically Strong One-Way Function In
Which The Key Is Changed For Every Log Record.
If A Unit Other Than The Logging Client Initiates
The Log Delete Request It Has To Obtain The
Delete Tag From The Logging Client And The
Relevant Upload-Tag. Note That Deletion Or
Rotation Of Log Records Is A Significant
Operation And As A Result Needs To Be
Undertaken After Substantial Reflection.
System Architecture:
We Suppose That The Organization Maintains The
Log Generators And The Logging Client. The Log
Monitor Can Be Preserved By The Same
Organization Or Can Be A Separate Entity. The
Logging Client Can Also Play The Role Of A Log
Monitor. We Develop Our Model Assuming That
The Log Monitor Is A Separate Entity That Is
Trusted By The Logging Client. Since The Logging
Client And Log Monitor Function Autonomous Of
Each Other They Can Communicate Only In An
Asynchronous Manner. This Means That If A
Logging Client Wants To Post Some Data To The
Log Monitor Or Vice Versa The Sender Cannot
Wait For The Receiver To Be Online To Receive
The Data. As A Result The Sender Has To Put Out
The Data In Some Location And The Receiver
Needs To Get Back The Data From There When
Needed. The Logging Cloud Makes Easy This
Communication By Receiving And Servicing
Suitable Requests. The Logging Client And The
Log Monitor Communicate With The External
World Over An Unencrypted Network That
Provides Anonymous Full-Duplex Communication.
Our Proof-Of Concept Prototype Gets This Service
From The Tor Network. Attacks On The Tor
Network That Breach Secrecy Of Communicating
Parties Have Been Well Studied And Solutions
Proposed.
Anonymous Upload-Tag Generation:
To Make Sure That This Key Value Cannot Be
Traced Back To The Logging Client That
Uploaded The Data Nor Does The Log Monitor
That Look For The Data. For This Purpose The
Log Data Is Stored At The Cloud Indexed By An
Anonymously Generated Upload-Tag. This
Upload-Tag Is Shaped By The Logging Client In
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Cooperation With The Log Monitor. It Has The
Possessions That It Is Created By Publicly
Available Information. Conversely A Given
Upload-Tag Cannot Be Linked Either To The
Corresponding Logging Client Or A Log Monitor.
To Recover Log Data From The Cloud The Log
Monitor Sends A Retrieve Request To The
Logging Cloud Using An Upload Tag. The Upload-
Tag Is Not Sent In An Encrypted Manner. Thus
Any Adversary Can Use The Upload-Tag To
Regain The Corresponding Log Data. However
The Log Data Can Be Decoded If And Only If The
Analogous Decryption Key Is Available.
Anonymous Upload:
The Logging Client Sends A Formatted Message
Containing The Upload-Tag, A Delete Tag And A
Batch Of Previously Prepared Log Data. The
Delete-Tag Is Used Later On To Delete Or Rotates
The Log Data If The Logging Client Or Another
Entity Authorized The Logging Client Needs To
Do So. Since All Messages To The Logging Cloud
Are Over Anonymous Channels Any Unit Can
Potentially Ask The Logging Cloud To Delete A
Log Data. To Avoid This From Happening The
Logging Cloud Challenges The Supplicant Of Such
A Delete Operation To Prove That It Has The
Necessary Authorization. Of Course This Can Be
Achieved Unimportantly By The Logging Client
Since It Can Be Anonymously Genuine By The
Logging Cloud.
Anonymous Retrieve:
This Protocol Is Straightforward. The Unit That
Needs To Download Log Data Most Of The Time
The Log Monitor Sends A Retrieve Request
Anonymously Jointly With The Upload-Tag
Equivalent To The Desired Log Data. The Logging
Cloud Gets The Data From Its Storage Space And
Sends It Over The Anonymous Channel To The
Requester. The Cloud Provider Does Not Have To
Validate The Requester. This Is Because By Asset
Of The Log Batches Being Encrypted The
Retrieved Data Is Useful Only To Those Who Have
The Valid Decryption Keys.
Anonymous Delete:
To Delete Log Data The Delete Requester Sends A
Suitable Delete Message To The Logging Cloud. In
Response The Logging Cloud Throws A Challenge
To The Requester. The Requester Proves Approval
To Delete By Presenting A Correct Delete Tag.
Log Batch Uploaded On Cloud:
We Use A Dependable Delivery Mechanism Of
Log Records From Log Generators To The
Logging Clients Which Though Not Explicitly
Indicated Can Be Amplified By Cryptographically
Strong Message Digests And Authentication Of
End Points Of Communication The Records
Produced By A Generator Are The Ones Received
By The Logging Client And Used In The Log
Batch Preparation. Our Scheme Can Also Detect
Truncation Attacks. If The Attacker Deletes Some
Trailing Log Records On The Logging Client The
Existing Collective Message Authentication Code
Will Be Cause To Be Unacceptable. An Adversary
That Is Camouflaged As A Logging Client Will Be
Detected By The Security In Place At The
Organization.
Experimental Results:
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We Designed A Set Of Simulations That Allows
Us To Analyze The Efficiency Of Different
Encryption Settings In Our Prototype. We Created
Test Situations To Understand The Time Overhead
That Is Introduced By The Log Record Preparation
Process. In Our Experiments We Used Batch Sizes
Of 10, 20, 30, 40, And 50 Encrypted Log Records.
For Each Log Batch We Deliberate Three Different
Log Preparation Settings. First We Deliberate The
Time That It Takes To Fill Up The Log Batch With
Log Records Without Any Security Related
Preparation. Therefore The First Experiment
Provides Us The Best Attainable Performance In
Our Prototype. Second We Measured An Overhead
For Filling Up Log Batch With Biased Security
Related Log Preparation. This Includes
Unencrypted Log Records No Confidentiality With
Calculated MAC And Aggregated MAC Functions
Correctness, Tamper Resistance And Verifiability
Assurances. Third We Intended An Overhead For
Security Preparation That Includes Encrypted Log
Records With Corresponding MAC And
Aggregated MAC Functions Correctness, Tamper
Resistance, Verifiability And Confidentiality
Assurances.
Conclusion:
We Proposed A Complete System To Firmly
Outsource Log Records To A Cloud Provider. We
Reviewed Existing Solutions And Identified
Troubles In The Current Operating System Based
Logging Services Such As Syslog And Sensible
Difficulties In Some Of The Existing Secure
Logging Techniques. We Then Proposed A
Complete Scheme That Addresses Security And
Integrity Issues Not Just During The Log
Generation Phase But Also During Other Stages In
The Log Management Process Including Log
Collection, Transmission, Storage And Retrieval.
One Of The Unique Confronts Is The Problem Of
Log Privacy That Arises When We Outsourced
Log Management To The Cloud. Log Information
In This Case Should Not Be Casually Linkable Or
Noticeable To Their Sources During Storage,
Retrieval And Deletion. We Provided Anonymous
Upload, Retrieve And Delete Protocols On Log
Records In The Cloud Using The Tor Network.
The Protocols That We Developed For This
Purpose Have Potential For Usage In Many
Different Areas Including Anonymous Publish-
Subscribe.
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